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Taxes matter.  We all know we need them to pay for public services. But 
most of us complain about them -- exercise our "voice" -- and often try to dodge 
them -- to "exit" -- when we can.
2  Those who design and implement tax systems, 
like those who try to escape them, for the most part consider themselves to be 
eminently ‘practical’ people responding to the world around them as they see it.  
As John Maynard Keynes (1936, 384-85) once said, however, “practical men, 
who believe themselves to be quite free from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist…..soon or late, it is ideas, not 
vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”  While true to some 
extent, at least when it comes to taxes this dictum both unduly flatters 
economists and puts too little weight on interests and other factors. Tax policy 
everywhere is shaped not only by ideas and vested interests but also by 
changing economic conditions, administrative constraints and technological 
possibilities, and, especially, the political institutions within which these factors 
are at play.
3   
 
  Developing countries are no different from others: ideas, interests, and 
institutions determine tax policy.  It is of course difficult to generalize about 
taxation in “developing countries” as a group.  Such countries encompass such a 
wide spectrum -- from small fragile and fragmented post-conflict states like 
Liberia and Afghanistan to large well-established and rapidly growing countries 
                                                 
1  Although some parts of the present document draw on a recent paper with a somewhat similar 
title (Bird and Zolt 2008) the two papers take essentially different approaches to the subject.  The 
approach taken in the present paper is developed at more length and from additional 
perspectives in Bird (forthcoming) which is focused more on the problems of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.  This written version of the lecture has benefited from comments by Govinda 
Rao and discussions with a number of other colleagues in India and is consequently, I hope, a bit 
more attuned to the situation in large countries like India that are growing rapidly but unevenly. 
2 See the famous study by Hirschman (1970) of the interplay of exit (economic responses) and 
voice (political responses).  
3 See, for examples,  Daunton (2001, 2002) on the U.K.,  Gillespie (1991) on Canada, Steinmo 
(1993) on Sweden, the UK and the US, Lieberman (2003) on South Africa and Brazil, and IDB 
(2006) on Latin America more generally. Tax technology is not discussed in detail in this paper: 
for a recent treatment, see Bird and Zolt (2007).   4
like Brazil, China, and India -- that there may seem to be few "tax challenges" 
that they face in common.  The ‘best’ tax system for any country reflects its 
economic structure, its capacity to administer taxes, its public service needs, and 
its access to such other sources of revenue as aid or oil. In addition it must also 
take into account such nebulous but important factors as ‘tax morale’, ‘tax 
culture’, and, perhaps above all, the level of ‘trust’ existing between people and 
their government.
4    
 
Despite the resulting variety of tax systems and possibilities found in the 
developing world, however, in one very important sense all developing countries 
do face the same basic tax challenge: how to meet public spending needs by 
raising revenue in a way that is not only economically sustainable but also 
conducive to the political survival of those making policy decisions.  
 
  Fortunately or otherwise, there is no shortage of those willing to set 
universal fiscal goals and standards for developing countries as a group.  Almost 
half a century ago, for example, Nicholas Kaldor (1963), fresh from his recent 
exposure to India's tax system, argued that  for a country to become ‘developed’ 
it needed to collect in taxes 25-30 percent of GDP. More recently, perhaps 
having noted that most developing countries (like India) remain well short of 
Kaldor's target, the UN Millennium Project (2005) was somewhat less ambitious 
in advising developing countries that on average they needed to mobilize only an 




  Most developing countries have consistently failed to meet such targets. 
A few fast-growing Asian countries such as India have managed to reach and 
even exceed the UN-prescribed 4 percent of GDP increase in tax ratio in the 
early years of this century but it is by no means clear that these new higher levels 
will be sustainable.
6   In most developing countries the tax ratio has changed 
surprisingly little in recent decades. The belief that some seem to hold that 
developing countries can increase their tax take simply through more vigorous 
                                                 
4 For introductory discussions of the three factors mentioned, see, respectively, Frey (2002), Edling 
and Nguyen-Thahn (2005), and Bergman (2002). 
5 For a recent summary of tax levels and structures in countries grouped by income level, see Fox 
and Gurley (2005). Of course, ‘revenue’ is not identical to (or limited to) tax revenue but such 
niceties are neglected here. Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2006) analyze both revenue 
and tax ratios in developing countries and find no great differences in most instances.  
6 For instance, as Poirson (2006) shows, general government revenues as a share of GDP have 
been surprisingly constant over time in India.   5
collection efforts is particularly naïve.
7  There is more to improving tax effort than 
simply exhorting countries to try harder. 
  
Of course some who tell developing countries they should collect more 
taxes have not been reluctant to tell them how to do it.   In the post-World War II 
period, for instance, most commentators assumed that a highly progressive 
personal income tax (sometimes with marginal rates ranging up to 60 or 70 
percent -- or, as in India, even as over 90 percent) buttressed by a substantial 
corporate income tax (often at 50 percent or so) constituted the ideal tax system. 
Both revenue and redistribution goals, it was argued, could be achieved by 
imposing high effective tax rates on income, essentially because the depressing 
effects of taxes on investment and saving were considered to be small.
8  
Consumption taxes were grudgingly accepted as necessary for revenue 
purposes, but the sooner such levies were replaced by decent income taxes the 
better.
9  No one talked about local taxes since all the action was at the central 
government level. Nor did anyone worry much about the international context 
since tax policy was considered a domestic affair.  In short, to exaggerate only a 
bit, the conventional wisdom at the time was that all developing countries needed 
to do to solve their fiscal problems was, as the UN Millennium Project still seems 
to assume,  in the words of Kaldor (1963) simply to “learn to tax” -- by which he 
meant to tax in a properly progressive fashion.  
 
The world has changed, however, and so have ideas about taxation.  As 
a recent IMF study (Norregaard and Khan 2007) correctly notes, there remain 
huge gaps in the evidence with respect to the effects of taxes and "herd thinking" 
in tune with the fashion of the day continues to be as influential in taxation as in 
most areas of public policy. Nonetheless, many economists now think that high 
tax rates not only discourage and distort economic activity but are also largely 
                                                 
7 One of the best documented cases in which better administration increased revenues markedly in 
a short time was Argentina’s rapid expansion (from 13 to 23 percent of GDP) over the the 1989-
92 period.  Morrisset and Izquierdo (1993) estimated that about two-thirds of this increase was 
attributable to improved administrative effort. As in other cases, however, subsequent experience 
in Argentina demonstrated how difficult it is to sustain such increases over time (Bergman 2003).  
When improved technology or increased administrative effort expands revenues, in many 
instances it appears that political pressures soon dampen or even fully offset any resulting net 
increase in tax ratios (Martinez-Vazquez 2001). 
8 Indeed, an extra bonus of high rates was considered to be that they made it easier to lead balky 
private investors by the very visible hand of well-designed fiscal incentives into developmentally 
productive channels: for a review of the unrewarding experience with such incentives, see Bird 
(2000). 
9 Kaldor (1956) famously proposed an expenditure tax for India, but he did so not because he was 
against taxing ‘ability to pay’ but because he thought the expenditure base came closer to 
measuring ‘spending power’ than did income as conventionally defined for tax purposes. His 
similar proposal for Ceylon (Kaldor 1960) -- now Sri Lanka -- was actually implemented but never 
amounted to much and was soon abolished (Goode 1961).    6
ineffective in redistributing income and wealth.  Indeed, though reflecting more 
the competitive international environment of recent decades than the 
persuasiveness of economists, income tax rates on both persons and 
corporations have been sharply reduced around the world.  In Latin America, for 
example, the average tax rate on corporations fell from 41 percent in 1985 to 29 
percent in 2003 and the top rate on personal income from 51 to 28 percent.   
Over this period, collections from direct taxes in Latin America increased by only 
5 percent (from 4.0 to 4.2 percent).  Since trade taxes also declined, the tax 
share of GDP in the region would actually have declined had it not been for a 
substantial (70 percent) increase in VAT revenues.  Indeed, as elsewhere in the 
world, VAT has now become the mainstay of the revenue system in Latin 
America owing both to rate increases – the regional average VAT rate rose from 
11 to 15 percent in 1985-2003 -- and to broader bases and improved 
administration.
10   
 
The combination of declining taxes on international trade as a result of 
import liberalization and WTO adherence with increased competition for foreign 
investment has motivated similar changes in tax structures in developing 
countries in other regions as well. However, policy-makers in some countries 
seem to have been more reluctant than those in Latin America to cut income tax 
rates and to put more emphasis on domestic consumption taxes such as VAT 
perhaps because they see such suggestions as little more than code for 
“increase taxes on the poor.”  Even those that did follow the Latin American 
model for the most part have seldom offset the potential revenue losses of 
income tax rate reductions by base expansions.
11  
 
  No matter what any country may want to do with its tax system, or what 
anyone might think it should do from one perspective or another (ethical, political, 
or developmental), what it does do is always constrained by what it can do. 
Economic structure, administrative capacity and political institutions all limit the 
range of tax policy options.  Nonetheless, even in the most constraining 
situations some options almost always exist.  The consensus of most fiscal 
experts, almost regardless of political stance,
12 seems to be that the best way for 
developing countries to respond to the tax challenges they face, in the current 
jargon, in expanding their “fiscal space” along the revenue axis (IMF 2006) -- are 
                                                 
10  See Lora and Cardenas (2006) The effect of base and administrative changes is evident 
because ‘VAT productivity,’defined as VAT revenues as a percentage of GDP divided by the 
(standard) VAT rate rose substantially in the region over the period. More refined calculations 
approximating the VAT base more closely show similar results (Bird and Gendron 2007). 
11 In contrast, developed countries that cut corporate rates usually did expand the tax base in 
compensation (Norregaard and Khan 2007). 
12 For three recent surveys from different perspectives that basically reach the conclusion stated in 
the text, see Toye (2000), Moore (2004), and Heady (2004).      7
essentially three: (1) broaden tax bases (especially of consumption taxes), (2) 
reduce rates (especially of income taxes), and (3) improve tax administration. 
Although in reality each of these three pathways to reform is interdependent, in 
the next few sections I shall briefly consider each in turn.  
 
 
II. Broadening Tax Bases 
 
 
  Most discussion of taxation in developing countries seems to assume, as it 
were, that “unto each a base is given.”  If the tax base is indeed ‘given’ then the 
only policy issue would be how best to exploit it -- for example, by reducing 
exemptions and bringing non-payers into the tax net.  Such measures are indeed 
important in most countries, but this focus is too narrow.  Tax bases are not 
simply ‘given’ to governments: they can be ‘grown’ – or destroyed – through the 
manner in which a given tax burden is collected.  For example, taxes may 
discourage, or encourage, the ‘formalization’ of the economy, or they may foster 
or discourage the growth of such ‘tax handles’ as imports, or they may be used to 
shape and direct economic growth into particular channels in a variety of ways 
and for a variety of purposes.   
 
  In the hurly-burly of politics and the technical wonderland of fiscal analysis 
it is all too easy to overlook such ‘developmental’ effects of tax policies.  Yet in 
the long run the manner in which (and from whom) taxes are collected may affect 
not only growth and distribution but also the future level and mix of revenues 
itself.
13  These long-run effects of policy decisions affecting both tax design and 
tax administration need more attention.  
 
  Consider, for example, four questions that are often posed with respect to 
the challenges facing tax policy in developing countries: 
 
•  Should more reliance be put on consumption than on income taxes? 
•  Are broader tax bases always better than narrower bases?  
•  Should tax policy be designed to reduce the size of the ‘informal 
economy’?  
•  What should be done with tax incentives? 
   
                                                 
13 For recent distinct but related analyses relevant to this theme, see Emran and Stiglitz (2005), 
Auriol and Warlters (2005) and Gordon and Li (2005). In a different framework, Poirson (2006) 
makes much the same point in the context of India.   8
  The conventional answers of most fiscal experts -- if not always of 
governments -- to these questions are straightforward: 
  
•  Consumption taxes are better. 
•  So are broader bases. 
•  Every effort should be made to tax the informal sector. 
•  Tax incentives are almost always a bad idea.  
 
  But do all these answers hold up when considered from the perspective of 
the long-run development of ‘tax base policy’? 
 
  In many developing countries personal income taxes often amount to little 
more than taxes on labor income and are equivalent to consumption taxes paid 
in advance. At the same time, although little revenue is received from capital 
income, both income and consumption taxes in practice often impose high 
marginal effective rates on investment and hence discourage growth.
14  S u c h 
taxes deliver neither equity nor growth.  What a tax is called -- income or 
consumption -- matters less than how it really works.  
 
On the other hand equity and growth are sometimes surprisingly 
compatible. For example, not only must the poor consume to be productive but 
societal disaffection with the inequities accompanying growth often seems to 
require some degree of visible fiscal correction in order to sustain growth-
facilitating policies. The first of these points suggests that a good VAT in many 
developing countries may sometimes be one that excludes a significant fraction 
of the consumption of poor people.
15 Broader bases are not always better.   
Poverty alleviation through the fiscal system is primarily a tax for expenditures, 
not taxes.  But it is also important not to make the poor even poorer through 
taxes. At the very least, heavy selective taxes on items that constitute major 
consumption expenditures for poor people should be avoided.
16  
                                                 
14  See Poirson's (2006) description of the current Indian tax system for a depressingly good 
example. 
15 In the case of Jamaica, for example, exempting only five narrowly-defined items cut the VAT 
burden on the lowest 40 percent of the income distribution in half (Bird and Miller 1989).  In 
principle, a more inclusive tax base combined with a targeted subsidy would of course be 
preferable but such refinement is not attainable in the circumstances of many developing 
countries. As Bird and Gendron (2007) suggest, it may be better for a variety of reasons to 
subject such items to a reduced rate rather than to exempt them completely.  Of course, such 
decisions should be made only after detailed consideration of the circumstances prevailing in the 
country in question.  
16 As Hughes (1987) notes, for example, taxing fuel correctly can be difficult in countries like 
Indonesia or India in which petroleum products (in this case, kerosene or paraffin) are an 
essential consumption item for the poorest people.  As mentioned earlier, the option of using the 
tax system to deliver income support to low-income people as in some developed countries   9
On the other hand, the second point mentioned above suggests that there 
may also be an important continuing role in most fiscal systems for the income 
tax -- the "mirror of democracy" as one fiscal history labeled it (Webber and 
Wildavsky1986).  Most developing countries thus probably need both income and 
consumption taxes but they need the right kind of each: the details of design and 




  A tax system concerned to facilitate growth should both reduce the cost of 
operating in the formal sector
18 and increase the cost of operating in the informal 
sector.  Imposing higher taxes on traditional agriculture is usually difficult both 
politically and administratively and it may not always be equitable, but it is likely 
conducive to growth by shifting resources away from the traditional agriculture 
sector -- a development that always and everywhere accompanies growth (Bird 
1974).  Much the same can be said about presumptive taxes on informal sector 
activities even though such taxes are often so badly designed and operated that 
they are horizontally inequitable and seldom yield much revenue (Bird and 
Wallace 2004). When countries have large informal sectors even a bad tax on a 
‘good’ base may be a good idea (Auriol and Warlters 2005).
19  
 
  Conventional wisdom also seems right about what should be done with 
virtually all tax incentives: eliminate them. Despite their continuing popularity 
almost everywhere, tax incentives are usually redundant and ineffective: they 
reduce revenue and complicate the fiscal system without achieving their stated 
objectives.  Even to the limited extent that some incentives are effective in 
inducing investors to behave differently than they would have done in response 
                                                                                                                                     
requires both that the tax administration is efficient and that most people file tax returns.  Neither 
condition is satisfied in most developing countries.  However, it is possible that technological 
improvements such as smart mobile phones and the Internet may soon make both transfers and 
taxes more easily "personalized" even in remote areas of poor countries: for further discussion, 
see Bird and Zolt (2007). 
17 For discussion of general and selective consumption taxes see, respectively, Bird and Gendron 
(2007) and Cnossen (2005). 
18 Consider, for example, the recent World Bank publication Paying Taxes 2008 in which India rests 
near the bottom (165 out of 178 countries considered) compared to, say, Singapore which ranks 
second in the world with respect to the costs to formal business of complying with the tax system.  
If India is serious about growth, something clearly needs to be done to simplify its tax system and 
improve its tax administration -- a conclusion that also emerges strongly from the recent studies 
of compliance costs carried out at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (e.g. 
Chattopadhyay and Das Gupta 2002). 
19 Or it may not, if, as is sometimes the case (World Bank 2003), the result of creating a "simplified" 
tax system intended to entice people from the informal sector into the formal sector is instead to 
encourage formal sector entrepreneurs to pretend that they too are small in order to hide in the 
simplified sector while at the same time erecting an additional barrier to firms moving from the 
small (tax-favored) sector to the normal tax system.   10
to market signals the result is often inefficient, diverting scarce resources into 
less than optimal uses (McLure 1999).  
 
The political (and sometimes even theoretical) appeal of twisting the tax 
system into a collection of clever gimmicks that seem to do something for any 
good cause of which one can think is obvious.  So, alas, is the grim reality of the 
bad things that experience has again and again demonstrated tend to happened 
once one starts down the tempting road.  Loading more and more objectives on 
the tax system through incentives opens the door to inefficiency and inequity and 
reduces the chances that the tax system can achieve its main objective of 
adequately funding essential public sector activities.   Tax incentives improve 
economic performance only if government officials are better able to decide the 
best types and means of production than are private investors.  Since 
observation suggests strongly that people are likely to spend ‘other people’s 
(taxpayers) money’ with considerably less care than they do their own, this 
proposition seems inherently implausible.  Excessive use of tax incentives 
complicates administration, facilitates evasion and encourages corruption. Once 
created, concessions usually prove hard to remove and tend to be enlarged at 
the initiative of taxpayers who lobby for more concessions or simply redefine 
existing concessions in unforeseen and presumably undesired ways. Get rid of 
them. 
 
If one cannot simply eliminate tax incentives, I have elsewhere suggested 
three simple rules to reduce the damage that may be caused by poorly-designed 
and implemented incentives: keep them simple, keep records, and evaluate the 
results (Bird 2000).   Alas, very few developing countries have managed to follow 
even such basic rules as these: the political advantages of ambiguity seem 




III. Lowering Tax Rates 
 
 
For many developing countries the challenge is not so much whether to 
increase revenues -- in most cases they must do so if they are to grow and 
prosper -- but rather how to do so.  Essentially, there are only three possibilities:  
raise rates, expand bases, and improve administration.  Raising rates within the 
                                                 
20 Apart from introducing tax expenditure budgets, for which there is much to be said (Surrey and 
McDaniel 1985), developed countries seldom do much better but of course the social costs of 
such mistakes tend to be relatively less important for the rich than the poor.   11
existing system is the most obvious approach, and it is often also the most 
politically acceptable approach.  Unfortunately, it is almost always the least 
economically desirable solution.  Raising rates when traditional tax bases are not 
expanding, new bases can shift abroad, and administration is weak is unlikely to 
increase revenue much if at all.  Even if revenues do increase, so may both 
inequity and inefficiency.   
 
Distortions associated with taxation increase (broadly) with the square of 
the tax rate, so inefficiency definitely increases with increased rates, particularly 
rates affecting economically mobile factors and actors such as foreign investors.  
Horizontal inequity may also increase because only those few unfortunates 
inextricably trapped within the tax system bear the burden.  When those who 
comply are penalized and those who cheat escape, a country is not on the path 
to building a sustainable revenue system.  Moreover, since it is often easier to 
increase taxes on politically weaker segments of society, even vertical inequity 
may be exacerbated by rate increases in some instances. 
 
  Of course, taxes themselves are not a cost but simply a mechanism for 
transferring resources from private to public use. However, taxes do impose real 
economic costs that reduce the resources available for other public or private 
purposes.  Developing countries -- where resources are by definition scarce – 
can least afford such waste and should strive to keep such costs as low as 
possible in order to free resources for socially desired objectives.   
 
  The resources used in administering and complying with taxes (or, for 
that matter, evading them) are real economic costs: they reduce the ability of the 
economy to provide goods and services. In addition, taxes change the relative 
prices businesses and individuals confront and hence alter decisions to work, to 
save, and to invest.  The result in most cases is to reduce output and welfare.
21 
 
                                                 
21 There are of course exceptions.  First, when taxes are ‘lump sum’ – i.e. the tax burden is the 
same regardless of behavioral responses – there are no distortionary effects.  But such taxes are 
of no importance in the real world. Second, to the extent that taxes fall on economic rents – 
payments to factors above those needed to induce them into the activity concerned -- they may 
not affect economic activity. Well-designed taxes on natural resources and land, for example, 
may thus to some extent produce revenue without economic distortion.  Finally, some taxes may 
not only create no distortions in economic behaviour but may even induce desirable behaviour.  
Certain environmental levies, for example (even such crude proxies such as taxes on fuel), may 
to some extent have such effects.  “Good” taxes – those with no bad economic effects – should 
of course be exploited as fully as possible, but most revenue needed to finance government 
inevitably comes from less ‘harm-free’ sources and hence gives rise to efficiency costs.   12
  These efficiency losses from taxation are real and sometimes 
substantial.
22  However, they are not directly visible: they arise essentially 
because something does not happen or happens in some other way than it would 
have in the absence of the distortionary tax.  Output that is not produced is 
output (and potential welfare) lost but it is seldom politically visible.  Nonetheless, 
good tax policy in developing countries requires designing design taxes to 
minimize such adverse outcomes -- keeping such costs as low as possible while 
also achieving revenue, growth, and distributional goals as effectively as 
possible.  This is no small task.  
 
To the extent that efficiency costs of taxation result from a rational policy 
decision to redistribute income through the fiscal system a country may of course 
decide that the price is worth paying. After all, fairness is a key issue in designing 
any tax regime.  Even so, the costs of taxation can generally be reduced by 
shifting to consumption taxes (especially VAT) instead of income taxes. 
Nonetheless, some have recently suggested that ‘growing’ governments in 
developing countries on the basis of VATs rather than income taxes is a bad idea 
on both distributive and efficiency grounds.
23   
 
It is thus worth considering briefly three questions: 
   
•  First, are even the most nominally progressive income taxes in 
developing countries very redistributive? Without going into detail, the 
evidence seems clear: the answer is – not much.
24   
•  Second, are VATs in developing countries inevitably regressive? The 
answer is – not always or necessarily.
25   
•  And third, are there circumstances in which a ‘good’ VAT may be better in 
distributive terms than a ‘bad’ income tax? Unsurprisingly, in light of my 
answers to the first two questions, there may indeed be such 
circumstances, depending as usual upon the details of both the country 
and the two taxes.   
 
                                                 
22 The lowest estimates of the efficiency costs of taxes for developed countries are at least 20-30 
percent of revenues collected, and much higher estimates (ranging well over 100 percent) are 
common in the literature (Auerbach and Hines 2002). While few such empirical studies exist for 
developing countries, some recent evidence (Warlters and Auriol 2005) suggests that the 
efficiency costs of taxation appear to be of the same order of magnitude.   
23  See, for example, Emran and Stiglitz (2005).  For further discussion of a few of the many 
complex points touched on (or skipped over) in this section, see Bird and Zolt (2005). 
24 For a nice explanation of the rationale for this conclusion, see Harberger (2006). For useful 
summaries of studies on the quantitative incidence of taxation in developing countries see Chu, 
Davoodi and Gupta (2000) and Gemell and Morrissey (2003), and for well-taken skepticism 
about the assumptions underlying  most such studies see Shah and Whalley (1990). 
25  For examples and discussion, see Bird and Gendron (2007).   13
  Take the example of a country with a large shadow economy.  Income 
taxes do not reach this sector – and indeed appear to be associated with its 
expansion (Schneider and Klinglmaier 2004). In contrast, to some extent a VAT 
functions like a presumptive tax on the informal sector.  The reason is because 
VAT credits are available only to registered firms so that those operating in the 
shadow sector are taxed when they purchase formal-sector commodities as they 
almost always do to some extent for both business and consumption purposes.
26 
Increasing income taxes often discourages the expansion of firms in the formal 
sector both by taxing them directly and by taxing their employees in contrast, 
increasing VAT tends to make life in the formal sector relatively more attractive 
than the informal alternative-- subject to the important proviso that the tax is not 
so perversely and badly administered as to raise the entry barriers to entering the 




  If combined with increased excises on such important higher-income 
consumption goods as motor vehicles, the substitution of indirect for direct taxes 
may in some instances even prove to be more progressive than relying more 
heavily on a personal income tax that affects only a limited group of formal sector 
wage earners and discourages the expansion of the formal sector.  On both 
distributional as well as efficiency grounds, there may thus sometimes be much 
to be said both for broad-based consumption taxes like VAT and for a limited set 
of excise taxes as important components of the revenue system – as indeed they 
already are in most developing countries.  But there are also good reasons for 
keeping direct taxes on both income and property in the tax mix as well.  To 
maintain and grow a state, the tax system must tap into growing sectors of the 
economy, and a mildly progressive personal income tax is one way of ensuring 
that state revenues get their fair share. Properly applied, both income and 
property taxes may play a role in ‘state-building’.
28 Sustainable tax policy needs 
                                                 
26 For an important study along these lines, see Glenday and Hollinrake (2005); see also Keen 
(2006). 
27 An example appears to be Ukraine (World Bank 2003).  The uncomfortably close ranking of India 
and Ukraine in terms of the compliance costs of paying taxes in the latest World Bank (2008) 
study is cause for concern. Bangladesh, which ranks lower than either, may well be another 
example. The argument in Emram and Stiglitz (2005) that VAT may discourage formalization 
may perhaps be valid in some extreme cases depending on important details of tax structure and 
tax administration that they do not explore in detail but it certainly should not, on the evidence, be 
unduly generalized. 
28 The case for property taxes is developed at length in Bird and Slack (2004) -- although the 
present unimportance of such taxes in developing countries is set out clearly in Bahl and 
Martínez-Vazquez (2007).  The general point made in the text emerges in different contexts in 
various recent studies: see, for example, Sokoloff and Zolt (2005) and Hoffman and Gibson 
(2004) as well as the general discussion and case studies in Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 
(2007).   14
to be accepted as fair by those affected. Since automobiles and big houses are 
more visible than income, the more effectively such items are taxed, the better. 
Finally, corporate income taxes are needed to buttress personal income taxes, to 
ensure an equitable share of the returns on cross-border investment, and to tap 




IV. Improving Tax Administration 
 
 
Reaping revenues from tax rate changes (whether up or down) requires 
effective tax administration. Raising revenues through base expansion requires 
even better administration. New taxpayers must be identified and brought into the 
tax net and new collection techniques developed.  Such changes take time to 
implement.  The best tax policy in the world is worth little if it cannot be 
implemented effectively.  What can be done to a considerable extent inevitably 
determines what is done. One cannot assume that whatever policy designers can 
think up can be implemented or that any administrative problems encountered can 
be easily and quickly remedied.  How a tax system is administered affects its yield, 
its incidence, and its efficiency.  Administration that is unfair and capricious may 
bring the tax system into disrepute and weaken the legitimacy of state actions.   
 
  Good tax administration is a difficult task even at the best of times and in the 
best of places. Conditions in few developing countries match these specifications.  
How revenue is raised - the effect of revenue-generation effort on social capital, 
equity, the political fortunes of the government, and the level of economic welfare - 
may be more important from many perspectives than how much revenue is raised.  
The private costs of tax compliance as well as the public costs of tax administration 
must be taken into account.  Assessing the relation between administrative effort 
and revenue outcome is by no means simple: it is important, for example to 
distinguish the extent to which revenue is attributable to the active intervention of 
the administration rather than its relatively passive role as the recipient of revenues 
generated by other features of the system. Improving administrative efforts and 
outcomes is not impossible but it is neither easy nor quick.
29 
 
Experience around the world demonstrates that the single most important 
ingredient required for effective tax administration is clear recognition at high 
                                                 
29 For detailed discussions, see Bagchi, Bird, and Das-Gupta (1995), Gill (2000), McLaren (2003) 
and Bird (2004) well as the case studies in Gillis (1989), Bird and Casanegra (1992), Thirsk 
(1997), and Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998).   15
political levels of the importance of the task and willingness to support good 
administrative practices -- even if political friends are hurt.  Few developing 
countries have been able to leap this initial hurdle.
30  Frequently, urged by 
international agencies or simply desperate to get more revenues, countries have 
from time to time launched frantic efforts to corral defaulters or to rope in new 
victims without hurting politically powerful interests -- and also usually without 
providing the time, resources and consistent long-term political support needed 
to do the job.  Such efforts are doomed to failure. Collecting taxes efficiently and 
effectively without fear or favor is especially difficult in countries that are 
politically fragile.  Without such efforts, however, no viable long-term tax system 
can be created.  
 
If the political will exists, the techniques needed for effective tax 
administration are not secret: have a clear strategy; keep it simple; treat 
taxpayers as clients; chase down defaulters; keep a tight check on corruption; 
and use available technology wisely.  Sound use of such IT approaches as 
withholding, information reporting, web-based client focused interfaces with the 
private sector, and value chain analysis and monitoring -- all activities going on 
all the world in both private and, increasingly public sectors -- can be enormously 
effective in reducing corruption, curbing evasion and improving revenue yields.  
To be effective, however, such technological approaches need to be 
implemented effectively: new technology to some extent may compensate for 
common human failings but in the end its successful implementation inevitably 
depends heavily on the effective utilization of human capacities.   In practice, to 
date technological solutions for tax administration problems in developing 
countries remain more hopes than realities with a few notable exceptions such as 
Chile and Singapore. Nonetheless, increasingly technology appears to offer 
potentially promising paths to at least partial solutions in many developing 
countries (Bird and Zolt 2007). 
 
V. The Political Economy of Taxation 
 
Tax policy decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Nor are they made by a 
benevolent government.  Instead, they are the outcome of complex social and 
political interactions between different groups in society in an institutional context 
established by history and state administrative capacity. Taxation is not simply a 
                                                 
30 See, for instance, the telling comparison in Bergman (2003) of Argentina, which conspicuously 
has not leapt this hurdle, and Chile, which has.  As IDB (2006) notes, there is still much we do 
not understand about why Chile has been able to do so much in terms of improving tax 
administration.  As Bergman (2003) shows, however, the willingness of Chile’s leaders – of very 
different political persuasions – to support effective administration stands out.   16
means of financing government; it is also a very visible component of the social 
contract underlying the state.  Citizens are more likely to comply with tax laws if 
they accept the state as legitimate and credible and are to some extent both 
willing to support it and afraid of what will happen to them if they don’t.   
 
  Improving tax outcomes thus depends in large part upon how different 
political groups perceive proposed changes and how they react to these 
perceptions.  In this sense, major tax reform is thus always and everywhere “an 
exercise in political legitimation” (Lledo, Schneider, and Moore 2003).  Those 
who will have to pay more must be convinced that they will get something 
worthwhile for their money.  Those who do not want to pay more must not be 
able to block reform and, in the end, must be willing to go along without taking to 
the hills in revolt or fleeing the country. Those who will have to implement the 
reform must also support it or at least not actively sabotage it. And of course 
politicians have to see sufficient support to warrant putting reform not only on the 
agenda but on the ground. 
 
Reforming taxes is always a one-off operation in the sense that it occurs 
in the unique circumstances of a particular country at a particular time.
31  
Nonetheless, some seem to believe that there must be some simple solution to 
be found somewhere else in the world that can replace the seemingly unending 
problems and process of negotiation found in their own country. Examples of 
such magic solutions currently floating around the world are flat taxes, simplified 
presumptive regimes for small business, and semi-autonomous revenue 
authorities, to mention only three.
32   
 
Much can indeed be learned from studying how different countries have 
coped with tax reform: the solutions reached may be different but the basic 
problems that must be faced are often rather similar.  How one country dealt with 
a problem may provide useful hints on how another may do so.
33 Comparative 
analysis of tax reform experience around the world, like formal tax theory, can 
never provide a complete answer for any particular country. But it can help. 
 
Most studies of tax reform experiences understandably focus on the 
substance of reform. A more fundamental question, however, is not what should 
be taken into account in developing a tax reform proposal but rather how tax 
                                                 
31 Much of what follows relates only to ‘major’ tax reforms (Bird 2004a).  Many countries constantly 
“reform” their tax systems by altering rates, redefining bases, and adding and clarifying 
interpretations to existing law, and it is not always a simple matter to tell when such ‘technical 
changes’ constitute a major reform but this issue is not discussed further here. 
32 Some substantive reform proposals are discussed in more detail in Bird (forthcoming).  Space 
precludes going into detail on these matters in the present paper. 
33 Bird and Slack (2007) apply this approach to the case of property tax reform, for example.   17
reform should be approached.
34 Careful and comprehensive attention to 
institutional arrangements for tax reform will not only improve the quality of the 
reforms proposed, it will also increase the likelihood of their adoption and 
successful implementation.  All too many abortive "reform" experiences in all to 
many countries demonstrate that to do a better job countries need to pay 
adequate attention to such basics as developing more adequate capacity to draft 
tax legislation and to gather and analyze data relevant to tax reforms as well as 
developing the procedural systems and administrative capacity to implement 
them.  Above all -- and far too neglected -- is the critical need to ‘sell’ reforms not 
only to those who must approve them (politicians), but also to those who must 
administer them (officials), to those who will discuss them in public (the policy 
community), and, most importantly, to those who must endure them (the 
business community and the public).
35   
 
When it comes to tax reform, "ownership" matters.  So does leadership.  
So does a coherent strategy, and of course adequate resources both to develop 
good ideas and especially to implement them effectively.  Good tax policy 
planning involves economists, lawyers, administrators, and – never to be 
forgotten – adequate discussion with taxpayers, tax practitioners, and tax agents.  
Building up adequate institutional capacity in the tax field along all these lines, 
both inside and outside government, is critical to being able to adapt policies to 
changing circumstances -- to give them the robustness and resiliency needed for 
sustainability. Of course even the best planning and best implementation will not 
produce useful results unless there is also adequate political leadership, careful 
attention to building the necessary political coalitions, and close attention to the 
perceived needs of citizens as aggregated through parties, interest groups, and 
what is now often called civil society.  Even the best product will not sell unless it 
is properly marketed.  Tax reform, which in developing countries almost 
inevitably embodies increases for some, is inherently a hard sell.  In the end, tax 
reform always and everywhere is an exercise in practical politics. Successful tax 
reform is never easy.  But it can be achieved -- if countries really want to do so.
36   
 
 
                                                 
34 Of course even the best process for studying and developing reform proposals will never be 
enough to bring about good policy changes in the absence of a coherent strategy, continuing 
support from above, and an acceptable level of administration: see the interesting discussion in 
IDB (2006). 
35 The need to get business on side reflects not only the importance of business decisions for 
economic growth and the importance of direct taxes on business such as taxes on business 
property and corporate income taxes.  It also arises from the critical role that business plays as 
the effective tax collector for such other taxes as withheld taxes on wages, interest and dividends 
and sales and excise taxes. 
36See Thirsk (1997) and Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998) for case studies of successes.   18
 
A precondition for a major change in the country's tax system is often a 
change either in the political balance or in economic circumstances.  In normal 
times a ‘good’ tax reform may be like a ‘good’ seat belt law: if everything else 
stays the same, lives will be saved --the tax ratio will increase.  But things do not 
stay the same: some people drive faster when they are belted in -- tax 
administration effort may diminish and concessions to favoured groups multiply.
37  
The result that is that tax ratios -- like death rates from road accidents after the 
introduction of a seatbelt law -- often change little even after major tax reform.  
Countries appear to achieve an equilibrium position with respect to the size and 
nature of their fiscal systems that reflects the balance of political forces and 
institutions and then to stay there until ‘shocked’ into a new equilibrium by 
political upheaval or external economic pressure. 
 
Ideas on the relevant balance between taxes and society forged over the 
first half of the 20
th century have changed in many countries, as evidenced by the 
death of death taxes in developed countries
38 and the limited success of 
developing countries in achieving the high levels of income taxation to which 
many of them aspired in the post-colonial period (Bird and Zolt 2005).  Although 
reality in terms of both tax levels and the distribution of tax burdens has changed 
much less in most developing countries, attitudinal and environmental changes 
are clearly influencing current thinking about tax policy everywhere.    
 
For the relevant decision-makers in any country to make the right 
decisions, however – ‘right’ in the sense that they reflect people's real 
preferences as closely as practically feasible -- everyone involved, not just 
decision-makers but also those whose fate is being decided, must be as aware 
as possible of the relevant consequences.  One key to sustainable good fiscal 
outcomes is often, for example, to link expenditure and revenue decisions as 
transparently as possible.
39  For a country to have a better tax system—better in 
the sense of giving the people what they want—it must first have a better political 
system in the sense of one that transmutes citizen preferences into policy 
decisions as efficiently as possible.  “Democracy,” as Churchill once said, “is the 
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from 
                                                 
37 For an interesting example, see the discussion of Mexico in Martinez-Vazquez (2001). 
38 For a neat explanation of this trend, encompassing changes in both economic structure and 
income inequality, see Bertocchi (2007). 
39 I am aware of the extent to which this statement may seem like heresy to those raised in the 19th 
century Gladstonian budgetary framework in which most of us still live.  For further discussion of 
particular forms of expenditure-revenue linkage, see Bird (2001) on decentralization, Bird (2005) 
on project financing, and Bird and Jun (2007) on earmarking.   19
time to time.”
40  Neither ‘representation without taxation’ nor ‘taxation without 
representation’ provides a sound basis on which to erect a fiscal system that will 
be both economically and politically sustainable in the long run.  
  
  Of course, the foregoing is somewhat idealistic but what is clear is that 
whether countries are democratic or not, taxation is always and everywhere a 
contested concept.  Some pay and some do not.  Some pay more than others.  
Some receive compensating services, some do not.  Such matters are—and in 
democratic states, can be—resolved only through political channels, messy 
though such channels usually are.  Indeed, history suggests that the need to 
secure an adequate degree of consensus from the taxed is one of the principal 
ways in which, over the centuries, democratic institutions have spread in some 
parts of the world.
41  Sustainable tax systems require a high degree of popular 
compliance, and for such compliance to be sustainable the tax system must 
reflect in some real sense the basic values of at least a minimum supporting 
coalition of the population.
42  
  
  A central problem in many developing countries, for instance, not least 
those like India that have been growing rapidly in recent years, is clearly 
inequality.  A key, and related, governance problem in many of the same 
countries is lack of accountability to the governed by the governing.  A better tax 
system may prove critical to the solution of both problems.  For example, 
revenue reforms that link taxes and benefits more tightly -- such as 
decentralization -- may help accountability -- though not necessarily reduce 
inequality.
43  On the other hand, reforms that replace highly regressive and 
                                                 
40 This quotation actually had a somewhat different implication in its original context, but 
nonetheless seems largely right even if one’s main concern is growth: as Lindert (2004, 344), 
concludes, history tells us that “the average democracy has been better for economic growth 
than the average autocracy….” 
41  See for example Sokoloff and Zolt (2005). No non-dictatorial government in this age of 
information and mobility can long stay in power without securing a certain degree of consent from 
the populace, not least in the area of taxation.  State legitimacy thus rests to a considerable 
extent on what Levi (1988) called the ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ of citizens with respect to 
taxation.  
42 Daunton (2001, 2002) shows that a great deal of attention was paid to precisely this task in 
Britain, with quite different tax levels and tax mixes being found most suitable to the ‘consensus-
maintaining’ objective over the years.  Gillespie (1991) tells a similar (more economics-focused) 
tale for Canada.  Lieberman (2003) to some extent tells similar stories with respect to Brazil and 
South Africa.  For a stimulating general model of the balancing of political and economic 
concerns in formulating and implementing tax policy in a democratic setting, see Hettich and 
Winer (1999).  Tridimas and Winer (2004) in effect extend this framework to non-democratic 
settings. 
43 Another such reform is earmarking (Bird and Jun 2007), but this too may, instead of improving 
matters worsen them if it captured by a particular interest, as may happen all too easily even in   20
inelastic excises by a less regressive and more elastic VAT may reduce 
inequality—especially of course if the increased revenues are invested in growth-
facilitating activities such as education and infrastructure.
44   
 
  From a normative perspective -- at least from my normative perspective -- 
the key function of taxes in developing countries is to provide (non-inflationary) 
funding for pro-poor and pro-growth spending programs, particularly on 
developing human capital.
45  As I have recently argued at length elsewhere, the 
best way to achieve this goal in most countries is likely through a relatively 
broad-based and relatively non-distortionary consumption tax like VAT,  precisely 
as conventional wisdom says -- although perhaps not the precise VAT suggested 
by that wisdom (Bird and Gendron 2007).   
 
  What any country actually does with its tax system, however, is inevitably 
determined in the first instance by political and not economic calculations.
46  
Countries vary enormously in the effectiveness and nature of their political 
systems.  Some may be close to ‘failed states’ in which institutions are so 
ineffective that it does not matter much what they attempt to do: it will not work.  
Others may be ‘developmentalist’ and wish to use their fiscal systems as part of 
a relatively dirigiste interventionist policy.  Still others may be more laissez-faire 
and disposition.  Some may be more populist, some more elitist, some more 
predatory.   
 
  The dominant policy ideas in any country (about equity and fairness, 
efficiency, and growth), like the dominant economic and social interests (capital, 
labor, regional, ethnic, rich, poor), and the key institutions, both political 
(democracy, decentralization, budgetary) and economic (protectionism, 
macroeconomic policy, market structure), interact in the formulation and 
implementation of tax (and budgetary) policy.  Uniform results are unlikely to 
emerge from this always boiling cauldron, with its different mixes of ingredients 
and highly variable cooking times in each country.  The changing interplay of 
                                                                                                                                     
developed and democratic countries.  There is no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to 
institutional design. 
44 Note that one implication of this argument is that relevant analysis of the incidence of policy 
changes must consider both sides of the budget: as Break (1974) noted, the ‘differential’ tax 
analysis beloved of economists (and illustrated by almost all extant incidence studies) is usually 
not the most relevant approach for policy purposes. 
45 Growth-facilitating human capital activities such as education are probably the best way to 
reduce inequality in most countries, but some direct support activities such as minimal cash 
transfers are likely always to remain necessary for those unable to take advantage of such 
opportunities. 
46 Of course, as Hettich and Winer (1999) develop in detail, political and economic factors are often 
interdependent. See also the extensive theoretical and empirical literature surveyed in Persson 
and Tabellini (2000, 2002).   21
ideas, interests, and institutions affects both the level of taxation and its structure.  
Indeed, as Joseph Schumpeter (1954) noted long ago, and as an increasing 
number of political scientists have recently come to realize, taxation is one of the 
clearest arenas in which to witness the working out of these complex forces.  
 
Viewed in long-term perspective, few developing countries have as yet 
completed even the earlier parts of the long cycle that produced the (more or 
less) redistributive and (more or less) growth-facilitating fiscal states now found 
to varying extents in most developed countries.
47 There is no inexorable historical 
law that decrees developing countries must similarly undergo a long preparatory 
period during which the idea of the desirability and even necessity of a larger 
state and at least a modestly progressive fiscal (tax + expenditure) system 
becomes part of the social framework.  Still, it seems fair to say that whatever 
their goals may be many governments in developing countries are in dire straits.  
Even those countries that have reached relatively safe harbors politically with a 
sustainable degree of legitimacy and stability are often in an economically 
precarious situation.  The budget is politically and economically constrained.  Life 
is difficult.  Nothing can be done.  Such conclusions are easy to reach in many 
countries: but they also offer too much a counsel of despair and too easy an 
excuse to avoid making needed, and possible, decisions.   
 
Even in the most hopeless situation something can usually be done to 
improve matters.  Taxation is a bone of contention in every country. It may 
therefore seem a bit odd to argue that most countries would be better off if there 
were even more informed public dispute about such matters.  However, unless 
and until an adequate degree of political consensus on what should be done is 
achieved, no significant tax changes are likely to be made in reality no matter 
what new laws may be put on the books. To a considerable extent the main tax 
challenge facing many developing countries is essentially that there is as yet no 
implicit “… social contract between governments and the general population of 
the kind that is embedded in taxation and fiscal principles and practices in 
politically more stable parts of the world” (Lledo, Schneider, and Moore 2004, 
39).  
 
Like today's newspapers, history tells us that such principles do not 
become embedded either painlessly or quickly.  The few substantive suggestions 
that I have made above to help developing countries face their basic tax 
challenge -- such as better VAT administration on a broader base --are of course 
already the stuff of countless existing reports. As an expert myself I am delighted 
                                                 
47 Compare the different, but parallel, stories told by Lindert (2003) and Alesina and Angeletos 
(2003) about how different developed countries have reached quite different fiscal equilibria.   
Why should uniform outcomes be expected in the much more heterogeneous developing world?   22
to be able to conclude that many countries would be better off if they did more of 
the good things that experts advise.  The real question, however, is: why have so 
many done so little?   
 
A recent study of Latin America suggested, perhaps somewhat wistfully, 
that if countries wish to improve their tax systems they should “…improve political 
institutions in ways that broaden and deepen social contracts.  For example, 
create more responsive and less clientelistic political parties, more cohesive and 
less polarised party systems, and improved capacity of civil society to monitor 
government and participate in tax debates (Lledo, Schneider, and Moore 2004, 
40).” I agree: as I said earlier, there can be no good taxation without good 
representation.  But how useful is it to advise a country that it should be 
something other than what it is?   
 
In the end, if any country needs or wants better tax policy or 
administration, it can have it: the answer largely lies in its own hands.  Even 
those who want to do the right thing, however, can often use help in finding out 
just what is right and how it can best be done.  It is always easy for those not 
playing a game to give advice to those who are trying to play it, but it is seldom 
useful to do so.  Those outside politics -- and perhaps particularly foreigners -- 
who wish to foster better sustainable tax systems in developing countries can 
generally put their efforts and resources to better use if they play in the right 
game.  That game is not the short-term political game in which policy decisions 
are made.  Instead, it is the long-term game of building up the domestic 
institutional capacity both within and outside governments to articulate relevant 
ideas for change, to collect and analyze relevant data, and of course to assess 
and criticize the effects of such changes as are made.   
 
Such long-term ‘institution-building’ activities are seldom immediately 
rewarding.  They are certainly out of fashion.
48  It always seems more appealing 
and immediately productive both to outside advisors and often to governments 
themselves to establish ‘benchmarks’ for success, to support this particular 
organizational change here (revenue authority) and that new technology 
(computerization) there -- and all too often concessions, reliefs and incentives all 
over the place -- than it does to help countries acquire the institutional tools they 
need to reach better decisions on their own.  It is always tempting to believe that 
simple ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches can provide quick (but sustainable!) answers 
                                                 
48 In this depressing scenario, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in India is a rare 
exception. Of course even the best "think tanks" are not enough: as Yoingco (1976) shows, for 
many years the Philippines had by far the best developed and institutionalized tax planning 
process in Asia, and indeed  in some respects perhaps in the developing world.  Unfortunately, in 
the absence of a propitious political environment the results in terms of better policy were not 
very evident in the Philippines.   23
to the many complex problems inherent in reforming tax policy in difficult 






I have argued that what any developing country does to reform either its 
tax structure or its tax administration generally depends less on the economics of 
taxation than on the politics of taxation. From the perspective of someone outside 
the policy arena in any particular country, I have also suggested that the best 
way in which experts and aid agencies can help developing countries meet the 
many tax challenges they face is by assisting them to create the human and 
institutional capacity they need in order to do so.
49  
 
 Some may think that these conclusions are so vacuous as to provide 
little if any practical operational guidance to would-be tax reformers.  I might, for 
example, instead have expounded at length about the need for countries like 
India that are increasingly engaged in international business to take more 
seriously the task of fitting their tax systems into the changing international 
setting -- or else trying to change that setting in the first place.  I have not done 
so, however, in part because for too many years fiscal experts like me have 
landed at airports around the world carrying briefcases and laptops crammed 
with ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions.  Such oversold ‘silver bullets’ as revenue 
authorities, improved information technology (IT), European-type VATs, flat taxes 
and the like have missed the target so often in so many countries, that it seems 
more than time for those seriously interested in improving tax policy and 
especially tax outcomes in developing countries to face up to the fundamental 
question: how best to encourage and facilitate countries in the critical task of 
building the capacity they need to find their own solutions in their own ways?
50  
 
                                                 
49 I should perhaps note that there are a number of things most developed countries could do to 
their own tax systems and their aid policies to make the lives of policy-makers in developing 
countries simpler. For example, it is astonishing to see agencies that commonly urge countries to 
strengthen their revenue systems at the same time insisting that all their aid and technical 
assistance to such countries completely escapes domestic taxation. Much could also be said 
about the lack of international fiscal forums directly responsive to the needs of developing 
countries.  However, such issues are not the focus of this paper.   
50 It may be, as Clark (2007) has recently argued in a notably pessimistic appraisal of the prospects 
for most developing countries, that the time will not be "ripe" for such actions can be effective in 
many countries for more years than most of us care to contemplate but such deep questions 
cannot be considered further here.    24
A corollary of this argument is that any advice on policy specifics that may 
accompany such capacity-building assistance should be delivered not from on 
high but only on request.  Lenders concerned with fostering particular outcomes 
may of course still wish to impose fiscal conditions of various sorts, and those 
seeking money may sometimes choose to accept them, but one must not 
confuse such exchanges of threats and promises with the development and 
implementation of sustainable fiscal reforms.   
 
No doubt such games will continue to be played for years to come. 
However, those who really want to help developing countries meet the tax 
challenges they face can likely best assist them by improving the institutional 
framework within which they operate.
51   Improving the transparency and 
understanding with which fiscal issues are discussed by all relevant players, both 
domestic and international, is not a boring bit of institutional building to be gotten 
out of the way before getting down to the "real business" of tax reform.  On the 
contrary, 50 years of experience tells us that, precisely because the great 
ongoing tax game is an integral part of political reality in all countries, aiding and 
abetting such capacity-building activities is in the long run, and perhaps even in 
the short run, the real "real business" of tax reform.  Moreover, this may be the 
only feasible way which outsiders may perhaps be able to assist at least some 
developing countries to implement the meaningful and substantial tax reforms 
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